by Andrea Mairate[1]
Macroeconomists generally view climate change as a classical collective action problem where individuals, or groups of countries and other actors must cooperate to effectively address a global issue that affects everyone. The problem arises when individual actors, such as nations or corporations have incentives to act in their own self-interest rather than cooperating for the common good. If countries fail to acknowledge the harsh reality of climate change and its high social, economic and ecological costs, no country or individual would be better off. This is why multilateral cooperation frameworks like the UN Conference of Parties (COP) are needed and are still alive despite the anti-green backlash in Europe, and more strongly in the United States.
A decade after the Paris agreement, COP 30 convened on November 10th 2025 in Belem amid a turbulent geopolitical landscape. The Conference showed how the new multipolar world has changed the framework of climate negotiations through the positions of respective blocs of nations. The main reason was not the absence of the US, depriving the EU of its former ally. During the two weeks of the negotiations, Europe overestimated its own influence as one of the most advanced in climate action and conversely underestimated the power of Brics+ countries. This has made it more difficult to reach a compromise in delivering more ambitious outcomes. Although COP30 was regarded by the organizers as a real-world implementation COP, it lacked ambition in addressing the key challenges posed by the accelerating climate change.
EU’s climate diplomacy
Ahead of COP30, all countries were expected to put forward a new or updated climate plan – known as a Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC) – showing how they will help keep global warming limited to well below 2°C, and pursue efforts to keep it to 1.5°C. Just before COP30 began, the EU confirmed its new NDC: a commitment to cut 66.25% to 72.5% of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions by 2035 (compared to 1990 levels), grounded in its newly adopted 2040 target of 90% net GHG emissions reduction, marking a clear path to climate neutrality by 2050 (European Commission 2025 a, b c).
However, some EU countries were late in handling their climate plans, leaving little time for building up diplomatic leverage. Divisions inside the EU also prevented them from joining initiatives for greater climate ambitions. A clear example is the roadmap for transitioning away from fossil fuels. While many EU countries supported this, Italy and Poland could not agree at the time. Similarly, the EU was not amongst the 29 signatories that sent a letter to the COP30 presidency to complain that the final text draft did not contain references to roadmaps and other efforts. Most of the EU countries were supportive, but 10 EU countries including Greece, Hungary, Italy, Poland and Slovakia, did not.
Towards the end, talks nearly collapsed after a clash between the European-led alliance of more than 80 countries against a Saudi led opposition and its allies, including Russia and India. Only after the EU threatened to veto the final text of the deal did it get some concessions. To appease the EU delegation, the Brazilian presidency of COP30 tweaked the text with a reference to a deal on transitioning away from fossil fuels, with discussions about how to achieve this planned for the coming year. The opposition of oil-producing countries achieved a proviso that this transition was a voluntary commitment rather than a legally binding decision.
The EU’s delegation’s efforts to speak with one voice for more ambitious goals were offset by countries or groups of countries with vested interests (e.g. oil producing countries). For instance, the road map on deforestation supported by the EU and climate change activists was excluded from the final deal. So were key provisions on the exploitation of critical minerals, often accompanied with abuses of human rights in some emerging countries, blocked by China and Russia.
China & BRICs+
China also achieved a diplomatic victory for the final text to include a clause saying that “measures taken to combat climate change, including unilateral measures, should not constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination or a disguised restriction on international trade.”
This aims directly at the EU’s Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism, or CBAM, which is due to come into effect for countries exporting to the EU in January 2026. This mechanism was to promote climate change action by encouraging manufacturers seeking to enter the European market to produce with low carbon footprints to align with EU standards. For China, fossil fuels is a domestic matter. What mattered to Chinese diplomats in Belém was to sell tools for decarbonization, which thanks to their technological dominance benefits Chinese manufacturers. The Europeans hoped that the Chinese would support them for a bolder agreement. But China finds that selling green products from electric vehicles, wind turbines and solar panels is a far more effective way of decarbonization than any UN text, even if the final text was signed by some 200 countries.
COP30 was the first taster of a new world order. Brics+ countries have been more assertive and present at COP30. China turned the conference into a trade negotiation. Oil-rich countries weakened the road map of transitioning out of fossil fuels. The EU delegates complained about the more emboldened Saudi Arabia, which constantly took the floor in meetings to derail the talks. In the end the EU could rely on a handful of countries, but it has lost much influence on the outcomes of the negotiations.
Climate finance
COP 30 concluded with an agreement to triple adaptation finance up to $120 billion per year, as part of the broader package of $300 billion per year in climate finance. While this was considered as notable progress, this target remains far below the actual needs of developing countries, which are bearing the costs of the climate crisis that they have not caused (WEO 2025). The negotiations also faced challenges in defining clear financial mechanisms, in particular inadequate commitments, weak operationalization and reporting systems, leading to a lack of predictable support for climate finance.
Looking ahead
While COP30 may not have made as much progress, and the outcome was far below expectations for many countries (CHLCs 2025)– with no formal agreements on fossil fuels and deforestation, it has shown that multilateral action remains the way forward to deliver progress, even in the absence of the United States (UNFCC 2025a). Ahead of COP30, the latest update to the UNFCCC’s 2025 Synthesis Report stated that 113 Parties submitted new or updated NDCs covering nearly 80% of global emissions. Their combined efforts would reduce emissions to about 12% below 2019 levels by 2035. By the end of the Conference, 121 countries had submitted NDCs to the UNFCCC, a significant step towards shaping the global climate framework (UNFCC 2025 b).
As the EU paved the way with long term commitments at home, it is urgent to strengthen climate action on a global scale but also deliver on implementation locally, especially on most vulnerable countries. In this regard, COP30 has been a key milestone. But the next COP, presided jointly by Turkey and Australia will be confronted with the same challenges. From this crisis there lies an opportunity, that of reflecting how the EU envisages to position itself and which alliances it wants to shape global climate action.
References
Climate High-Level Champions (CHLCs) (2025), Outcomes report, Global Climate Action Agenda at COP 30, 19 December 2025
European Commission (2025) EU negotiating mandate for COP30
European Commission (2025b) Press release: Commission welcomes strengthened EU climate ambition and progress on a 2040 target ahead of COP30
European Commission (2025c) EU at COP30 UN Climate Change Conference
UNFCCC (2025a), UN Climate Change Executive Secretary Simon Stiell closing speech at COP 30, 22 November 2025.
UNFCCC ( 2025b), Nationally Determined Contributions Synthesis Report, 10 November 2025
WEO (2025) What happened at COP 30 – and what comes next? 2 December 2025
[1] Former senior adviser, European Commission.
