by Augusto Ninni[1]
The Conferences of the Parties (COPs) have historically been the scenes of clashes between fossil fuel producing and exporting countries, and those willing to pursue an energy and ecological transition aimed at reducing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions in order to curb the rise in global temperatures. The spread of electrification and the greater availability of climate finance have increased the willingness of those countries – which represent the majority of the world’s population – that have to rely on fossil fuels for economic development to engage in combating climate change. Finally, there are countries (particularly small island states) that are already heavily affected by the consequences of climate change, mainly due to rising sea levels.
However, the COP held in November 2025, or COP30, in Belém (Brazil), took place in a global context that was even more complex and markedly different from previous COPs: a context of global disorder.
It was held without the politically significant participation of the United States (due to the return of Donald Trump to the presidency), against the backdrop of the European Union’s (EU) ecological transition policies being watered down (see Mairate’s contribution), and amid a more general cooling of interest and willingness to address climate change. There are many examples of this shift, even though climate change remains a priority in various transnational opinion polls: increasing local opposition to the siting of renewable energy facilities, partly for subjective landscape-related reasons; the reduction in both the number and ambition of the Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) submitted ahead of COP30; and changes in Bill Gates’ thinking.
by Ignazio Musu[1]
Relevant steps forward have been achieved in the recent years in the technological field to allow the energy transition required to reduce the excessive greenhouse gas emissions to face global warming and the related climate change problems without a lower economic growth.
Prices of solar and wind energies have been continually falling and so did the price of batteries to deal with their intermittency problems, relative to fossil fuels’ prices; however, being global climate change an environmental externality, technological progress to achieve it, although available, is not introduced automatically, but requires appropriate economic policy tools.
Economists focused on economic instruments of environmental policy acting on relative prices , such as carbon taxes, tradable pollution permits, aimed at introducing a carbon price, and subsidies to GHS emission abatement; but they seems to have ignored that this provides an incentive to adopt environmentally friendly technologies that already exist, whilst the required energy transition to fight climate change requires radical new emission reduction technologies, characterized by new infrastructures and institutions.
by Lino Sau[1]
The recent COP30, held in November 2025 in Belém, in Brazil, brought together nearly 200 countries to negotiate and strengthen global climate action, focusing not only on the implementation of the Paris Agreement, adaptation, and protection of the Amazon, but also pushing for greater climate ambition and emphasizing the fundamental role of climate and green finance.
As I will try to show, it is therefore important to analyse the role of the financial system in supporting this transition: both public and private financing channels are in fact necessary for the implementation and launch of the green transition.
As a starting point, it is necessary to define climate and green finance and highlight some of the differences between them, since they are indeed two terms that are often used interchangeably in the context of sustainable finance, but they have different meanings and applications.
by Andrea Mairate[1]
Macroeconomists generally view climate change as a classical collective action problem where individuals, or groups of countries and other actors must cooperate to effectively address a global issue that affects everyone. The problem arises when individual actors, such as nations or corporations have incentives to act in their own self-interest rather than cooperating for the common good. If countries fail to acknowledge the harsh reality of climate change and its high social, economic and ecological costs, no country or individual would be better off. This is why multilateral cooperation frameworks like the UN Conference of Parties (COP) are needed and are still alive despite the anti-green backlash in Europe, and more strongly in the United States.
A decade after the Paris agreement, COP 30 convened on November 10th 2025 in Belem amid a turbulent geopolitical landscape. The Conference showed how the new multipolar world has changed the framework of climate negotiations through the positions of respective blocs of nations. The main reason was not the absence of the US, depriving the EU of its former ally. During the two weeks of the negotiations, Europe overestimated its own influence as one of the most advanced in climate action and conversely underestimated the power of Brics+ countries. This has made it more difficult to reach a compromise in delivering more ambitious outcomes. Although COP30 was regarded by the organizers as a real-world implementation COP, it lacked ambition in addressing the key challenges posed by the accelerating climate change.
by Joël Ruet and Wang Xieshu[1]
How COP30 reinforced China’s ongoing renewable energy and industrial policy trajectory, serving as a platform to align domestic low-carbon strategies with global climate governance and strengthen its role in emerging clean energy markets.
SUMMARY - COP30 and China’s Renewable Energy Policy: Continuity, Reinforcement, and Emerging Dynamics
While COP30 functioned as a diplomatic reaffirmation and signalling event for China’s energy transition—highlighting renewable energy expansion, green innovation, and industry goals—direct evidence of new industrial policy measures directly caused by the summit remains limited. Instead, COP30 reinforced existing strategic priorities within China’s industrial ecosystem, solidifying renewable capacity targets, promoting green technology cooperation, and aligning industrial narratives with global climate governance, while new implementing policies are still emerging or pending formal articulation.
Held in November 2025 in Belém, Brazil, COP30 reflected a shift in global climate diplomacy toward the implementation of commitments rather than high-level target negotiation, recognizing the need to close the gap between pledges and concrete outcomes to keep warming below 1.5 °C. Although the summit fell short of decisive fossil fuel phase-out commitments, it amplified themes central to China’s evolving energy policy—renewable deployment, industrial decarbonization, and international cooperation on clean technology.
This essay examines how COP30 has shaped, reinforced, or revealed shifts in Chinese industrial policy toward renewables, situating these trends within broader economic planning and China’s role in global clean energy markets. The analysis shows that, while policy innovations directly attributable to COP30 are not yet fully crystallized, the summit served as an important platform for agenda reinforcement, international signalling, and strategic positioning of China’s renewable energy policy.
Overall, COP30 has reinforced rather than redefined China’s approach to renewable energy and industrial policy. By tracing developments before, during, and after the summit, the essay highlights that much of China’s low-carbon trajectory—driven by state-led investment, industrial planning, and emerging clean technologies—was already underway. At the same time, COP30 offered a venue for linking domestic priorities with international climate governance, signalling China’s commitment to green innovation, multilateral cooperation, and strategic industrial positioning. Discussion of post-summit trends, including energy storage, hydrogen, and value-chain strategies, underscores the continuity between domestic policy and global engagement, illustrating how China’s energy transition is shaped both by long-term structural developments and the opportunities for international collaboration that the summit provides.
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AFRICA: DEVELOPMENT, SUSTAINABILITY AND GREEN TRANSITION
Tuesday, January 27th 9.45 – 17.00 Aula SV002, Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore; Via San...