by Augusto Ninni[1]
The Conferences of the Parties (COPs) have historically been the scenes of clashes between fossil fuel producing and exporting countries, and those willing to pursue an energy and ecological transition aimed at reducing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions in order to curb the rise in global temperatures. The spread of electrification and the greater availability of climate finance have increased the willingness of those countries – which represent the majority of the world’s population – that have to rely on fossil fuels for economic development to engage in combating climate change. Finally, there are countries (particularly small island states) that are already heavily affected by the consequences of climate change, mainly due to rising sea levels.
However, the COP held in November 2025, or COP30, in Belém (Brazil), took place in a global context that was even more complex and markedly different from previous COPs: a context of global disorder.
It was held without the politically significant participation of the United States (due to the return of Donald Trump to the presidency), against the backdrop of the European Union’s (EU) ecological transition policies being watered down (see Mairate’s contribution), and amid a more general cooling of interest and willingness to address climate change. There are many examples of this shift, even though climate change remains a priority in various transnational opinion polls: increasing local opposition to the siting of renewable energy facilities, partly for subjective landscape-related reasons; the reduction in both the number and ambition of the Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) submitted ahead of COP30; and changes in Bill Gates’ thinking.
Based on the results of COP30, three different conclusions can be drawn, depending on the perspective adopted:
- From the general perspective of the fight against climate change – essentially the core raison d’être of the Conferences of the Parties since their inception – COP30 was something of a failure. This is exemplified by the inability to secure a sufficiently large majority to explicitly define a binding roadmap for phasing out fossil fuels (the “Dubai phase-out”) in the final resolution. The final text merely reiterates generic 2030 targets, without setting precise deadlines for coal and gas (Musu’s contribution focuses on this issue).
- From the perspective of climate finance, COP30 committed to a substantial increase in available funding, particularly for adaptation, by 2035 (see the contribution by Lino Sau). However, past experience suggests strong and widespread scepticism about the realism and feasibility of this commitment, i.e. about the actual implementation of the promised spending, especially in light of the reorientation of private finance following Trump’s return. It is true, however, that the principle of loss and damage has not been revoked (the relevant fund was established at COP27 in 2023), and now appears to have been operationalised.
- From the perspective of CO₂ reduction mechanisms, COP30 achieved significant success only in the area of reforestation, although this mainly benefits some emerging countries in Latin America (particularly Brazil) and Africa. The main innovation is the operational launch of the Tropical Forests Forever Facility (TFFF), with initial capitalisation of $5.5 billion (with the aim of reaching $125 billion), part of which is to be channelled directly to local Indigenous populations.
With regard to global disorder and its impact on the fight against climate change, the most negative development was clearly the election of Trump. In fact, he:
- immediately withdrew the United States from the 2015 Paris Agreement;
- promoted the expansion of fossil fuel production domestically, explicitly intervening against wind energy in particular;
- ended US participation in various international public financing initiatives, seriously undermining the energy transition in poorer countries (thus reducing their capacity for adaptation) and – since climate change is a “common bad” – generating strong negative global repercussions (according to Climate Watch data, the estimated reductions in CO₂ emissions by 2035 from “unconditional” NDCs amount to 4 GtCO₂e, while those from “conditional” NDCs – and thus the most affected – amount to 4.6 GtCO₂e);
- after COP30, in January 2026, withdrew the United States from 66 international organisations, including the UNFCCC, the IPCC and IRENA;
- signed an agreement with Ursula von der Leyen under which the EU committed to importing $750 billion worth of energy (mainly liquefied natural gas, LNG) from the United States by 2028 – a plan widely regarded as unfeasible in terms of both European demand and US supply, and inherently contrary to the logic of the energy transition.
Finally, immediately after Trump’s electoral victory – but before his official inauguration – in December 2024, the most important banks “coincidentally” withdrew from the Net Zero Banking Alliance (NZBA), an alliance aimed at channelling private savings towards renewable energy initiatives in developing countries. This point is also discussed in Lino Sau’s contribution.
A second factor that has altered Western countries’ approach to the energy transition is China’s rapid development in industries related to the energy transition (see the contribution by Ruet and Wang). There are several explanations for this. First, industrial policy considerations: the enormous expansion of production capacity around 2010 was not primarily intended to meet expected domestic demand, but to serve already significant foreign markets, generously supported by incentives. There was also a desire to reduce dependence on fossil fuel imports by expanding domestic renewable production, as well as to combat climate change and reduce pollution, particularly in major urban areas.
Continuous large-scale growth has led China to a position of global dominance (absolute in the case of photovoltaics) across all stages of the value chain: upstream inputs (including most key raw materials), manufacturing across all stages, storage (batteries), and downstream outputs, especially electric vehicles (again, see Ruet and Wang). This has significantly reduced global production costs, making electricity generated from renewable sources markedly cheaper than that produced from fossil fuels, thereby benefiting renewable energy deployment worldwide.
Recently, however, as in other Chinese industries, a phase of structural overcapacity has emerged, sustained by substantial government subsidies and the provision of credit at below-market interest rates through provincial authorities.
The decline in renewable energy costs – especially photovoltaics – nevertheless enabled China and India to reduce coal-fired electricity generation in absolute terms for the first time in history in 2025.
China’s dominance in photovoltaics prompted EU countries (through the Net Zero Industry Act, NZIA), following the United States under Biden (through the Inflation Reduction Act, IRA), to adopt protectionist measures in renewable energy manufacturing in order to reduce dependence on imports without formally resorting to tariffs. Under these laws, in certain cases, success in public tenders can depend on whether the winning firm comes from a country holding at least 65% of the relevant import market (NZIA), or whether it uses intermediate inputs not produced in the United States (IRA), in which case the contract may instead be awarded to the runner-up (unless it faces the same constraint).
In other words, geopolitical factors have become a powerful driver of the energy transition, often playing a leading role. The Russia–Ukraine war has contributed significantly to this dynamic, not only by driving up natural gas prices but also by requiring the rapid replacement of Russian gas supplies. Given the speed of this substitution, it led to a greater reliance on LNG, reducing both space and time for the development of renewables.
It is therefore reasonable to argue that global turmoil has split the energy transition into two tracks: on the one hand, Western countries, which have partially slowed the shift to renewables (while giving renewed impetus to nuclear power); on the other, emerging countries that are continuing along the transition path, either by accepting greater dependence on China or by launching national industrial development programmes (as in the case of India and others), often supported by foreign direct investment from Chinese firms (e.g. in Southeast Asia).
Among scholars most sceptical about COP30’s results, some have argued that global disorder signals the declining usefulness of organising intergovernmental meetings to achieve the energy transition at the pace and according to the criteria identified by the IPCC. However, as Mairate rightly observes, this view overlooks the fact that climate change is a classic collective action problem, subject to free-riding. It would therefore be unwise to abandon the COP framework as a policy instrument.
It is now worth briefly summarising the individual contributions presented in the newsletter, focusing selectively on a few key issues.
Ignazio Musu’s contribution addresses the consequences of COP30 for its central objective: the fight against climate change. He begins by highlighting a distinctive feature of the current energy transition, namely its reliance on government intervention combined with the growing economic competitiveness of new energy sources – a combination that was also central to previous energy transitions.
After briefly reviewing earlier COPs, Musu emphasises that in the case of COP30 “no commitment has been taken to phase out fossil fuels”, and that “the focus has shifted from mitigation to adaptation”. The fight against climate change, he argues, can only regain momentum if public opinion in the US and the EU changes its current political preferences, while China remains the only major country consistently pursuing a renewable-based energy strategy.
Lino Sau’s contribution analyses climate finance (distinguishing it from green finance). He identifies the key actors involved and devotes particular attention to the consequences of Trump’s return for the most important private-sector actor, the NZBA. This issue is crucial because many stakeholders stress that the expected contribution of private finance far exceeds that of public finance.
Sau then examines the outcomes of COP30, particularly the identification of a target of $1.3 trillion per year by 2035, the greater emphasis on adaptation over mitigation, and the role assigned to forest financing. Like many others, he expresses doubts about the actual implementation of these commitments in light of the American policy reversal.
Finally, Mairate and Ruet–Wang focus on the roles played by two major actors: the EU and China.
Mairate recalls that EU action in this field is shaped by the positions of individual Member States, rather than by a unified bloc as in trade or competition policy. This has resulted in internal divisions, partly reflecting historical dependence on coal (e.g. Poland), and partly reflecting the political orientation of governing majorities (e.g. Italy). It also raises concerns about the EU’s future stance on energy transition policies in the event of political changes in France or Germany.
Ruet and Wang, for their part, analyse China’s role as a central protagonist in the ecological transition. They show how China combines energy objectives (including strengthening the decoupling between economic growth and CO₂ and GHG emissions) with economic objectives, viewing renewable energy production both as a driver of growth and as a means of achieving technological leadership. The internationalisation of production through foreign direct investment – reinforced by the trade policies of both Trump administrations – further strengthens this dual ecological and economic strategy in several emerging countries.
References:
Carbon Brief, Cop30 Belem, Key outcomes agreed at the UN climate talks in Belém, https://www.carbonbrief.org/cop30-key-outcomes-agreed-at-the-un-climate-talks-in-belem
Carbon Brief, webinar Analysis: Why COP30’s ‘tripling adaptation finance’ target is less ambitious than it seems, 3 December 2025, https://www.carbonbrief.org/analysis-why-cop30s-tripling-adaptation-finance-target-is-less-ambitious-than-it-seems/
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[1] Adjunct Professor, Mercatorum University, Rome, and OEET, Torino.
